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A BRIDGE TO NOWHERE: EXPOSING COMPETITION AND PRICING 
REGULATIONS THAT LEAD TO MISMANAGEMENT AND WASTE IN 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
JIM R. MOYE* 
“The Federal Government has an overriding obligation to American taxpayers.  
It should perform its functions efficiently and effectively while ensuring that its 
actions result in the best value for the taxpayers.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States government has a dubious history of grossly overpaying 
for goods and services in its contracts.  A recent United States Department of 
Defense Inspector General Report found over $23 billion of wasted spending in 
contracts from Government Fiscal Year 2013 alone.2  This was an increase of 
almost $21 billion over the Inspector General’s findings in Government Fiscal 
Year 2012.3  One of the most egregious findings in the report was that the 
United States Army was purchasing coin-sized rubber wheels for over $1,600 
each; the actual value of the individual parts was only $7.71 each.4 
In a separate June 2013 report, the Department of Defense Inspector 
General detailed further financial mismanagement.5  In the report, the Inspector 
General determined that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), a subsidiary 
agency within the Department of Defense, overpaid a defense contractor by 
almost $14 million.6  Specifically, the report found that DLA Contracting 
Officers failed to establish “fair and reasonable prices” for the parts in question 
and failed to exercise proper contract oversight.7  Finally, the report suggested 
 
 * B.A., University of Southern California; J.D., The Catholic University of America, 
Columbus School of Law.  The Author would like to dedicate this Article to his father and 
mother, Jimmy R. Moye and Ulyesses Moye.  They stand as a shining example of the 
American Dream and the heights small business owners can reach with hard work and good 
ideas.  The Author can be reached for comments, questions, and suggestions at 
jim.r.moye@gmail.com. 
1.  Government Contracting Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 9755 (Mar. 4, 2009). 
2.  See Paul D. Shinkman, DoD Wastes Billions While Searching for Cuts, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REPORT (July 15, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/07/
15/pentagon-wastes-billions-on-contractors-and-lack-of-oversight-while-searching-for-cuts. 
3.  See id. 
4.  See id. (“Investigators also uncovered an instance in fiscal year 2011 where the 
Army was purchasing coin-sized rubber roller wheels used to load cargo for the inflated price 
of $1,678 each from Boeing.  They are each valued at only $7.71.”). 
5.  See Michael Fabey, Pentagon IG Faults Spare Parts Purchases from Boeing, 
AEROSPACE DAILY & DEF. REPORT (Oct. 4, 2013), available at http://awin.aviationweek.com
/portals/awin/cmsfiles/media/pdf/as_pdf/2013/10/04/asd_10_04_2013.txt.  
6.  See id. 
7.  See id. (“DLA Aviation guidance, the IG says, failed to require contracting officers 
to obtain and review contractor purchase order histories when determining fair and reasonable 
prices, or complete a subsequent review of pricing for spare parts after the parts were initially 
1
Moye: A Bridge to Nowhere: Exposing Competition and Pricing Regulations
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
10 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW: TOLLE LEGE [Vol. 60: p. 9 
that if DLA did not renegotiate the contracts with the defense contractor, it 
would continue to overpay for those parts long into the future.8 
Federal government contracting, despite a sagging economy, is big 
business.  Based on figures quoted in a United States House of Representatives 
Armed Services Committee Hearing, in Government Fiscal Year 2012,9 the 
United States government had contractual obligations totaling over $515 
billion.10  Those obligations totaled 14% of the total U.S. budget for that 
year.11  The Department of Defense alone accounted for over $360 billion 
worth of “federal contracts, which was more than all other [federal] agencies 
combined.”12 
The federal procurement system is heavily regulated, and with such intense 
scrutiny, it leads one to this question: how does the government substantially 
overpay time and time again for goods and services?  While there could be a 
number of reasons for the waste and mismanagement described above, there are 
three intertwined issues that seem to have the greatest impact.  Specifically, 
these issues center around the government’s inability to (1) create competition 
among a qualified pool of companies for contracts, (2) ensure that the bids from 
these companies reflect that competition, and (3) negotiate a final price that is 
reasonable.  Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, all government contracts 
must have overall competition, adequate price competition, and a “fair and 
reasonable price.”13  As shown in the instances above, the regulations seem to 
consistently fail to adequately protect taxpayers from overpayment snafus. 
Seemingly, the government’s contracting regulations are not in sync with 
the commercial market, make little sense, and lead to bad contract awards.  The 
average American should be alarmed at this trend, as the government’s inability 
to properly price and its tendency to overpay for items have been an issue since 
the early 1980s, and its current financial austerity measures do not lend 
themselves to such extensive waste.  This Article will examine the controlling 
competition and price determination regulations and analyze them using a 
common sense approach.  Section II examines the overall competition process 
for federal contracts.  Section III discusses whether the competition results in 
adequate prices.  Section IV outlines whether the successful price offer from a 
competition has a fair and reasonable price.  Section V notes the problems with 
each of these provisions.  Section VI provides various policy recommendations 
that will increase competition, create prices reflective of that competition, and 
result in fair and reasonable contract award prices.  These changes would better 
 
placed on long-term contracts, as allowed by the contract.”). 
8.  See id. (“If prices are not corrected, IG says, DLA Aviation will continue to overpay 
on future sole-source spare parts procured from Boeing on the contracts cited in the report.”). 
9.  The United States Government 2012 Fiscal Year is October 1, 2011 through 
September 30, 2012.  See 31 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012).   
10.  See Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go from Here?: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Twenty-five 
Years of Acquisition Reform]. 
11.  See id. (statement of Moshe Schwartz, Specialist in Defense Acquisition Policy, 
Congressional Research Service). 
12.  See id. 
13.  See 48 C.F.R. § 15.402 (2009). 
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ensure the best value for the government and protect taxpayers.  This Article 
concludes that these regulations are poorly written, lead to bad government 
contracts and embarrassing newspaper headlines, and fail to serve the greater 
good. 
II. OVERALL COMPETITION REQUIREMENTS 
To better understand the depth and range of the fair and reasonable price 
issue, one must first understand who may submit offers and the process the 
federal government utilizes to accept offers to provide goods and services.  
Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), there are only three ways in 
which procurements may be conducted.14  According to the regulations, offers 
are generated through full and open competition,15 through full and open 
competition after the exclusion of sources,16 and under listed statutory 
authority.17  Full and open competition “when used with respect to a contract 
action, means that all responsible sources are permitted to compete.”18  
Examples of full and open competition include sealed bids, competitive 
proposals, and a combination of competitive procedures.19  A practical example 
of full and open competition would be the General Services Administration 
releasing a Request for Proposal to provide property management services at a 
government installation and inviting all interested facilities management 
companies to submit timely and appropriate proposals. 
Under the requirements for full and open competition after the exclusion of 
sources, the government may exclude companies from submitting offers on a 
specific procurement if doing so would, among other things, increase or 
maintain competition, be in the interest of the national defense, or satisfy 
projected needs based on a history of high demand.20  It is important to note 
that the authority to exclude sources is vested with the head of a federal agency, 
 
14.  See id. §§ 6.000–603. 
15.  See id. § 6.102. 
16.  See id. § 6.202. 
17.  See id. § 6.302. 
18.  Id. § 2.101 (2013). 
19.  See id. § 6.102.  This provision calls for sealed bids, competitive proposals, and 
specialized proposal processes for specified situations.  See id.   
20.  Id. § 6.202.  The six reasons for excluding sources from a procurement are to:  
(1) Increase or maintain competition and likely result in reduced overall costs for 
the acquisition, or for any anticipated acquisition;  
(2) Be in the interest of national defense in having a facility (or a producer, 
manufacturer, or other supplier) available for furnishing the supplies or services in 
case of a national emergency or industrial mobilization;  
(3) Be in the interest of national defense in establishing or maintaining an essential 
engineering, research, or development capability to be provided by an educational 
or other nonprofit institution or a federally funded research and development 
center;  
(4) Ensure the continuous availability of a reliable source of supplies or services; 
(5) Satisfy projected needs based on a history of high demand; or  
(6) Satisfy a critical need for medical, safety, or emergency supplies. 
Id. 
3
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not with procurement or contracts professionals.21  The decision to exclude 
sources must be in writing and signed by the agency head.22  A practical 
example of full and open competition after exclusion of sources is when the 
federal government releases a Request for Proposal and limits which companies 
may participate to those that already provide a specific service to the federal 
government because the costs of initiating service would be inconsistent with 
the budget and timeline of the government’s acquisition plan. 
Finally, the regulations specifically define when non-competitive processes 
may be utilized to receive offers.23  Failure to use full and open competition is 
strictly prohibited by law, except in certain specifically defined situations.24  
These instances include, but are not limited to, where there is: only one 
responsible offeror, and the agency’s requirements cannot be satisfied 
elsewhere;25 unusual and compelling urgency;26 statutory authorization or 
requirements;27 national security interests;28 and a public interest.29  Each of 
the listed reasons has its own applications and limitations, which are generally 
spelled out in the individual provisions.30  A particularly infamous example of 
non-competitive processes is the sole source contract, which occurs when there 
is only one offeror for the contract. 
III. IS THERE ADEQUATE PRICE COMPETITION? 
After creating overall competition, the government verifies whether there 
was adequate price competition.  Adequate price competition can be achieved in 
three ways.  The first is when two responsible offerors, competing 
independently, submit priced offers that meet the government’s express 
 
21.  See id. § 6.202(b)(1). 
22.  See id. 
23.  See id. §§ 6.300–305. 
24.  See id. 
25.  See id. § 6.302-1(a)(2) (“When the supplies or services required by the agency are 
available from only one responsible source, or, for DOD, NASA, and the Coast Guard, from 
only one or a limited number of responsible sources, and no other type of supplies or services 
will satisfy agency requirements, full and open competition need not be provided for.”). 
26.  See id. § 6.302-2(a)(2) (“When the agency’s need for the supplies or services is of 
such an unusual and compelling urgency that the Government would be seriously injured 
unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or 
proposals, full and open competition need not be provided for.”).  The regulation also states 
that this provision applies if there is “unusual and compelling urgency preclud[ing] full and 
open competition, and [] delay in award of a contract would result in serious injury . . . to the 
Government.”  Id. 
27.  See id. § 6.302-5(a)(2) (“Full and open competition need not be provided for when  
(i) A statute expressly authorizes or requires that the acquisition be made through another 
agency or from a specified source, or (ii) the agency’s need is for a brand name commercial 
item for authorized resale.”). 
28.  See id. § 6.302-6(a)(2) (“Full and open competition need not be provided for when 
the disclosure of the agency’s needs would compromise the national security unless the 
agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals.”). 
29.  See id. § 6.302-7(a)(2) (“Full and open competition need not be provided for when 
the agency head determines that it is not in the public interest in the particular acquisition 
concerned.”). 
30.  See generally id. § 6.302. 
4
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requirements.31  The second is when there is an expectation that two 
responsible offerors, competing independently, would submit priced offers 
meeting the government’s express requirements, but only one submits an 
offer.32  The last way is when price analysis clearly demonstrates that the price 
is reasonable based on current or recent prices for the same or similar items, 
once the price has been adjusted to reflect changes in market conditions, 
economic conditions, quantities, or terms and conditions under contracts that 
resulted from adequate price competition.33 
The first definition of adequate price competition focuses on comparing the 
offers received.  First, the government verifies that there are two independent 
companies, deemed to be responsible as defined in FAR,34 that submitted offers 
to provide goods or services.  Next, the government awards the resulting 
contract to one of the companies, and price is a significant factor in the award.35  
Finally, the government makes a finding that the successful offeror’s price is 
not unreasonable.36 
So what would this look like in an actual federal procurement?  Assume 
that PayneCo and Nahraf are long time federal contractors.  They both submit 
 
31.  See generally id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(i).  The provision reads as follows:  
Two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, submit priced offers 
that satisfy the Government’s expressed requirement and if—  
(A) Award will be made to the offeror whose proposal represents the best 
value where price is a substantial factor in source selection; and  
(B) There is no finding that the price of the otherwise successful offeror is 
unreasonable. Any finding that the price is unreasonable must be supported by 
a statement of the facts and approved at a level above the contracting 
officer . . . .   
Id. (citation omitted). 
32.  See generally id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii).  The provision states: 
There was a reasonable expectation, based on market research or other assessment, 
that two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, would submit 
priced offers in response to the solicitation’s expressed requirement, even though 
only one offer is received from a responsible offeror and if—  
(A) Based on the offer received, the contracting officer can reasonably 
conclude that the offer was submitted with the expectation of 
competition, e.g., circumstances indicate that—  
(1) The offeror believed that at least one other offeror was capable of 
submitting a meaningful offer; and  
(2) The offeror had no reason to believe that other potential offerors did 
not intend to submit an offer; and  
(B) The determination that the proposed price is based on adequate price 
competition and is reasonable has been approved at a level above the 
contracting officer . . . .   
Id. 
33.  See generally §id. 15.403-1(c)(1)(iii).  The provision reads: 
Price analysis clearly demonstrates that the proposed price is reasonable in 
comparison with current or recent prices for the same or similar items, adjusted to 
reflect changes in market conditions, economic conditions, quantities, or terms and 
conditions under contracts that resulted from adequate price competition. 
Id. 
34.  See id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(i). 
35.  See id. 
36.  See id. 
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offers to provide office supplies to the United States Department of Agriculture.  
Both offers meet the government’s requirements.  Ultimately, the government 
chooses PayneCo’s offer because PayneCo has a commercial relationship with 
an office supply corporation and its price was lower by 2.5%.  In addition, there 
is nothing in the competition to make the government believe that PayneCo’s 
price is not reasonable.  Therefore, PayneCo’s successful offer is based on 
adequate price competition. 
The second definition of adequate price competition centers on 
expectations.  Specifically, the federal government conducts market research 
and uses past history to develop its requirements.37  The government then 
releases a solicitation for goods and services, expecting at least two 
independent, responsible companies would submit offers.  Instead, only one 
offer is received; the sole offeror believes that other responsible companies 
were capable of submitting and would submit offers.  Finally, agency 
executives above the Contracting Officer approve the award. 
For example, the government conducts market research and, based on that 
research, believes that at least five companies will submit proposals to provide 
said service.  The government releases a Request for Proposal to provide 
staffing services.  Argonis Company, who is deemed responsible, is the only 
company that submits a proposal.  Argonis Company had no inside knowledge 
of its competitors’ intentions, nor did it see any business-related reason not to 
submit a proposal.  The Contracting Officer, in the interest of time, 
recommended award to Argonis Company, and received approval from the 
Secretary of Agriculture.  Therefore, Argonis Company’s proposal would be 
deemed to be based on adequate price competition. 
The third definition of adequate price competition looks only at price 
analysis.  Specifically, the government conducts a price analysis of an offer and 
finds that the proposal price is reasonable because it is consistent with other 
similar procurements once it is “adjusted to reflect changes in market 
conditions, economic conditions, quantities, or terms and conditions under 
contracts that resulted from adequate price competition.”38  This definition 
would seem to be most appropriate for a non-competitive procurement, as it 
makes no reference to multiple offerors. 
The following example shows how price competition can be achieved 
through the third definition.  Assume that the Department of Defense issues a 
sole source contract to Darby Limited to provide storage containers to forward 
bases in Afghanistan.  Darby Limited submitted an offer to provide the 
containers for a two-year period.  The contract-award price was consistent with 
other contracts awarded to this company in Iraq and carried the same terms and 
conditions as the Iraq contract.  The Contracting Officer completed a price 
analysis of Darby Limited’s offer and found there was adequate price 
competition based on the similarity of the product, price, and contract terms. 
 
37.  See id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii). 
38.  See id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(iii). 
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IV. THE FAIR AND REASONABLE PRICE RULE 
After assessing overall competition and determining whether there is 
adequate price competition, FAR requires the federal government to purchase 
supplies and services from responsible sources at “fair and reasonable prices.”39  
Under FAR, the government establishes fair and reasonable pricing through 
three different means.40  To meet this standard, the Contracting Officer must 
obtain one of the following: (1) certified cost or pricing data, along with data 
other than certified cost or pricing data; (2) data other than certified cost or 
pricing data; or (3) “data necessary to establish a fair and reasonable price, but 
not more data than is necessary.”41  The regulation provides that until the price 
is found to be fair and reasonable, the government must continue requesting—
and the contractor must continue providing—data.42  Finally, the pricing 
 
39.  See generally id. § 15.402.   
40.  See id. 
41.  See id. § 15.402(a).  The provision requires that Contracting Officers: 
(a) Purchase supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable 
prices.  In establishing the reasonableness of the offered prices, the contracting 
officer— 
(1) Shall obtain certified cost or pricing data when required by 15.403-4, along 
with data other than certified cost or pricing data as necessary to establish a fair 
and reasonable price; or  
(2) When certified cost or pricing data are not required by 15.403-4, shall 
obtain data other than certified cost or pricing data as necessary to establish a 
fair and reasonable price, generally using the following order of preference in 
determining the type of data required:  
(i) No additional data from the offeror, if the price is based on adequate 
price competition, except as provided by 15.403-3(b).  
(ii) Data other than certified cost or pricing data such as—  
(A) Data related to prices (e.g., established catalog or market prices, 
sales to non-governmental and governmental entities), relying first 
on data available within the Government; second, on data obtained 
from sources other than the offeror; and, if necessary, on data 
obtained from the offeror.  When obtaining data from the offeror is 
necessary, unless an exception under 15.403-1(b)(1) or (2) applies, 
such data submitted by the offeror shall include, at a minimum, 
appropriate data on the prices at which the same or similar items 
have been sold previously, adequate for evaluating the 
reasonableness of the price.  
(B) Cost data to the extent necessary for the contracting officer to 
determine a fair and reasonable price.  
(3) Obtain the type and quantity of data necessary to establish a fair and 
reasonable price, but not more data than is necessary. Requesting unnecessary 
data can lead to increased proposal preparation costs, generally extend 
acquisition lead time, and consume additional contractor and Government 
resources.  Use techniques such as, but not limited to, price analysis, cost 
analysis, and/or cost realism analysis to establish a fair and reasonable price. If 
a fair and reasonable price cannot be established by the contracting officer from 
the analyses of the data obtained or submitted to date, the contracting officer 
shall require the submission of additional data sufficient for the contracting 
officer to support the determination of the fair and reasonable price.   
Id. 
42.  See id. 
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determinations must be separate and independent of any other contracts, and 
may not use price reductions as an evaluation factor nor consider profits or 
losses from other contracts.43 
A deeper review of the fair and reasonable price regulations proves that it 
is a complicated system.  First, FAR defines certified cost or pricing data as 
meaning “‘cost or pricing data’ that were required to be submitted in 
accordance with FAR 15.403-4 and 15.403-5 and have been certified, or are 
required to be certified, in accordance with 15.406-2.”44  The definition 
continues: “[the] certification states that, to the best of the person’s knowledge 
and belief, the cost or pricing data are accurate, complete, and current as of a 
date certain before contract award.  Cost or pricing data are required to be 
certified in certain procurements.”45 
Second, FAR does not define “other than cost or pricing data.”  Therefore, 
the federal government and contractors are left to interpret the language on their 
own.  A plain language understanding of the definition is information that the 
offeror has not certified that would assist a reasonable person in understanding 
an offeror’s pricing methodology. 
Third, the regulations require the submission of data necessary to establish 
the fair and reasonable price.  The provisions provide no timelines, definitions, 
or guidance on how to submit such necessary data.  Presumptively, the fact-
finding needed to establish a fair and reasonable price could continue 
indefinitely. 
The following example helps to better illustrate this issue of fact-finding 
continuing indefinitely.  The United States Department of Treasury announces 
its intention to award a sole source contract to Reynolds LLC to provide high-
capacity printers.  The company submits a price proposal, which included 
subcontractor and labor quotes, internal general and administrative information, 
and a certificate of cost and pricing data.  The Contracting Officer reviews the 
information, but feels the submitted information was insufficient to establish the 
price as fair and reasonable.  The Contracting Officer requests additional 
information from Reynolds LLC, which then submits a copy of a similar 
contract with the United States Department of Commerce.  The Contracting 
Officer reviews the contract and still is unable to determine whether the price is 
fair and reasonable.  The acquisition plan calls for the contract to be fully 
awarded within ninety days.  Because of the Contracting Officer’s inability to 
establish a fair and reasonable price, six months have elapsed and the contract is 
still not awarded. 
 
43.  See id. § 15.402(b).  The provision requires the government to “[p]rice each 
contract separately and independently and not—(1) Use proposed price reductions under other 
contracts as an evaluation factor; or (2) Consider losses or profits realized or anticipated under 
other contracts.”  Id. 
44. Id. § 2.101. 
45.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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V. AS CLEAR AS MUD: PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPETITION AND PRICING 
REGULATIONS 
“If someone were asked to devise a contracting system for the federal 
government, it is inconceivable that one reasonable person or a committee of 
reasonable people could come up with our current system.”46 
 
If one reviews the overall competition, adequate price competition, and the 
fair and reasonable provisions, it becomes abundantly clear that the system is 
broken.  On its face, the process is onerous and vague, and it fails to ensure that 
the contracts awarded are of the best value for the government. 
A. Problems with the Overall Competition Requirements 
There are three succinct problems with regulations governing the overall 
competition requirements.  First, the regulations do not adequately define two of 
the three provisions.  While the definition of full and open competition seems to 
be sufficient, the definitions for “full and open competition with excluded 
sources” and “other than full and open competition” are inadequate.  At first 
glance, the title and the definition of full and open competition with excluded 
sources are in conflict.  It is not “full and open” if a qualified source is removed 
from the competition, regardless of the rationale.  The term “other than full and 
open competition” is an apt title for the requirement, but the definitions in 
support of the requirement are lacking and contain no real protection from 
indiscretion. 
Second, the full and open competition requirements refer to the 
government’s obligation to utilize competitive procedures, but the provision 
outlines solicitation types.  Additionally, the list is not exhaustive.  This 
undoubtedly leads to a lack of standardization across federal agencies. 
Finally, the reasons provided for excluding sources do not make sense.  
Specifically, under the current language, the reasons provided include: to 
increase or maintain competition to lead to reduced overall costs; to ensure the 
continuous availability of a reliable source; to satisfy projected needs based on 
high demand; and to satisfy a critical need for medical, safety, or emergency 
supplies.  These reasons, commercially and practically, are all the reasons to 
expand competition.  The government cannot actually increase or maintain 
competition by restricting it, as it clearly states in the language.  Restricting the 
number of bidders would have the reverse effect and would ensure that the 
government does not have sufficient sources to meet critical high demand for 
medical, safety, or emergency supplies.  To read these provisions out of context 
would lead a reasonable reader to believe that they are the reasons for 
supporting unrestricted full and open competition, not for exclusionary 
 
46.  Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform, supra note 10 (quoting J. RONALD FOX, 
DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 1960–2009: AN ELUSIVE GOAL (2011)).  This quote has 
been commonly used throughout the past two decades, with its first use attributed to James F. 
Nagle.  See JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 519 (2d ed. 
1999). 
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purposes. 
B. Concerns with Adequate Price Competition Requirements 
There are three distinct inconsistencies with the adequate price competition 
provisions.  First, in the primary definition of adequate price competition, it 
states that such competition exists when, among other things, a proposed 
contract award is based on best value and price was a significant factor.  The 
provision fails to define “significant factor.”  Is it five, ten, or forty percent?  
Does it even have to be a quantifiable percentage?  Even though this 
requirement exists, there is insufficient guidance provided in the regulation.  
The lack of guidance ensures there will be no uniform application across 
agencies and gives excessive discretion to the Contracting Officer. 
The secondary definition of adequate price competition is even more 
troubling.  According to the regulation, if the government only receives one 
offer—but had an expectation that it would receive two or more offers—there is 
adequate price competition.  This may occur if the sole offeror had an 
expectation that there would be competition, had no reason to believe there 
would not be competition, and anticipated that at least one other competitor 
would submit an offer.  Such a requirement makes little sense because there is 
an underlying assumption that the offeror has inside information on other 
offerors.  In many instances, if a contractor had such intimate knowledge, there 
would be a sufficient basis to question the integrity of the procurement.  
Further, the requirement has the perverse consequence of giving a contractor’s 
perception some measure of control over the government’s procurement. 
Additionally, a key element of the provision centers on the government’s 
market research or “other assessment.”  There are no standards placed on the 
market research or assessment.  It places no timeframe, depth, or quality 
provisions for this requirement.  The regulation does not even require the 
market research to be tied to the commodity or service area contemplated in the 
procurement.  In short, it gives uncomfortably wide discretion to the 
Contracting Officer in this regard. 
The third instance, whereby adequate price competition is established 
strictly from a price analysis, is fatally flawed.  It places no overall competition 
requirement on the federal government.  Further, it relies solely upon other, 
similar contracts that have been adjusted for economic conditions, terms and 
conditions, and other changes.  This regulation is flawed on its face because it is 
attempting to compare procurements in which the ultimate goods or services are 
similar, but it compares nothing else.  Further, it does not place a time limit on 
the age of comparable procurement and, due to the lack of guidance, ensures 
uneven administration of the provision.  The provision lacks any controls and 
provides no guidance to a Contracting Officer attempting to comply with the 
requirements. 
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C. Issues with the Fair and Reasonable Price Rule 
There are four practical issues with the fair and reasonable price 
regulations.  As an initial matter, the regulations—and FAR for that matter—
fail to adequately define certified cost or pricing data.  Certified cost or pricing 
data is defined as “‘cost or pricing data’ that were required to be submitted in 
accordance with FAR 15.403-4 and 15.403-5 and have been certified, or are 
required to be certified, in accordance with 15.406-2.”47  There are neither 
examples provided nor guidance given on what information is acceptable.  
Additionally, there are no timeframes placed on the validity of the information 
presented or reviewed and no quality standards about said information. 
Second, in detailing the order of precedence of “other than cost or pricing 
data,” the regulations state that government agencies must first rely on 
information internally available; then on sources other than the offeror; and 
finally on sources from the offeror, if necessary.  This seems to force the 
government to go through a circuitous route to validate the data.  The 
regulations provide no guidance on whether the government can utilize 
information it already possesses.  Further, it places no standard on the 
applicability of the information based on the goods or services provided, on the 
timeframe in which the information covers, or on other contextual matters that 
may impact the quality of the data.  To state that the offeror should be the last 
source of information makes little sense, as they have generated the proposed 
price and can best explain the rationale behind the price offer. 
Finally, the regulations are vague as to the submission, compilation, and 
review of data.  For example, one regulation states that the Contracting Officer 
shall “[o]btain the type and quantity of data necessary to establish a fair and 
reasonable price, but not more data than is necessary.”48  Further, the provision 
states that “[i]f a fair and reasonable price cannot be established by the 
contracting officer from the analyses of the data obtained or submitted to date, 
the contracting officer shall require the submission of additional data sufficient 
for the contracting officer to support the determination of the fair and 
reasonable price.”49  How is that language to be interpreted?  It does not 
adequately define what kind of data can be considered cost or pricing data.  If a 
contractor provided a quote for similar services to another government agency 
or on the commercial market, would that be considered cost or pricing data?  
What if those quotes were five years old and were for 20% less?  Should the 
cost or pricing data reflect the fully burdened cost of providing the services or 
goods?  In short, the provisions are poorly drafted and raise more questions than 
they answer. 
 
 
47.  See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101. 
48.  Id. § 15.402(a)(3). 
49.  Id. 
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Government inefficiency is no secret.  Massive cost overruns and $500 
hammers kill millions of trees in auditor reports, white papers and newspaper 
series.  In short, if you hadn’t heard, you weren’t paying attention.”50 
 
The regulatory problems outlined above are significant, so it is essential 
that policy recommendations be made in hopes of creating a more efficient 
procurement system that does not end in embarrassing, bad procurement 
decisions. 
A. Overall Competition Requirements 
There are three proposed regulatory changes to bolster overall competition 
requirements.  The underlying goals of these proposed changes are to ensure 
consistency and to reinforce appropriate roles and responsibilities. 
1. Rewrite and Clarify Overall Competition Requirements 
A more efficient way to administer the overall competition requirements 
would be through a re-write of those requirements.  The proposed provision, 
which would replace title 48, sections 16.102, 16.202, and 16.302 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations, would read: 
Contract awards shall be achieved by full and open competition or 
other than full and open competition.  Full and open competition, 
when used with respect to a contract action, means that all responsible 
sources are permitted to compete.  In support of full and open 
competition, the Contracting Officer shall utilize the contracting 
methods contained in FAR parts 13, 14, 15 and 17.  
 
“Other than full competition” is any solicitation process in which 
participating offerors are restricted in any way or in which there is no 
solicitation process for purposes of contract award.  Full and open 
competition is the preferred method of contract-awarding for all 
government procurements.  “Other than full and open competition” 
may only be utilized in urgent and compelling circumstances; in 
support of classified missions for national security; in cases when a 
law or statute requires it; or a situation in which there is only one or a 
limited number of potential offerors.  The Contracting Officer and 
Head of the Contracting Activity will sign a Determination and 
Finding providing the faces of the contract-awarding.  The 
Determination and Finding will also state:  
 
 
50.  Editorial, FBI Takes Aim at John Wiley Price’s Role in Dallas County IT Deal, 
DALLAS NEWS (Nov. 21, 2012, 10:44 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/
20121120-editorial-fbi-takes-aim-at-john-wiley-prices-role-in-dallas-county-it-deal.ece. 
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 that the factual circumstances support an award based on other 
full and open competition, 
 that cost control methods will be utilized throughout the period 
of performance, 
 that awarded contracts will only utilize the Firm Fixed Price 
contract type, and 
 that quarterly performance and financial reports will be 
submitted to the Inspector General of the awarding department. 
 
There are a number of advantages to implementing the proposed 
modification.  First, it limits the categories of overall competition, which should 
alleviate confusion.  Second, the provision makes clear that full and open 
competition is preferred as a way of forcing Contracting Officers to always at 
least consider its utilization.  Generally, if there is full and open competition, it 
should result in the most commercially-practical contracts and pricing.  Third, 
the fact-finding that is required from the Contracting Officer should dissuade 
the use of other than full and open competition and increase accountability.  The 
required quarterly reports to the Inspector General should make it easier to 
monitor any contracts not awarded under full and open competition.  Finally, 
restricting the type of any contract awarded under other than full and open 
competition is critical, as a Firm Fixed Price contract places all of the risk on 
the contractor, which should provide some measure of protection to the federal 
government. 
B. Adequate Price Competition 
1. Remove the Ability to Find Adequate Price Competition Based on a Price 
Analysis 
As previously discussed, adequate price competition can be found strictly 
by a price analysis.51  The most pressing policy recommendation is to remove 
this requirement from the regulations.  If overall competition cannot be 
established in a procurement, it is improbable that a Contracting Officer could 
find adequate price competition.  Further, the lack of guidance and control over 
this process, especially given that it is utilized in support of sole and single 
source contracts, makes it a prime area for fraud and mismanagement.  This 
proposed change would also remove language that is vague and gives 
unnecessary discretion to the Contracting Officer. 
2. Remove All References to Contractor Knowledge and Expectations 
Currently, adequate price competition can be established when there is a 
single offer, when—among other things—the contractor believed there would 
be other offers, when other responsible offerors existed, and when other offerors 
 
51.  See generally 48 C.F.R. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(iii). 
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were capable of submitting an offer.52  For purposes of competition, it is 
irrelevant what an offeror believes, and there is no stated or evidentiary standard 
by which to prove or disprove such beliefs.  Additionally, the provision is self-
serving to the successful offeror, because it is not unreasonable to assume that 
any contractor placed in this position would act in its self-interest and attempt to 
preserve its proposed contract award. 
3. Rewrite the Adequate Price Competition Provisions 
There is no doubt that establishing adequate price competition is vital to 
ensure good competition for the federal government within the commercial 
marketplace and best value contract awards.  The proposed revision, which 
would replace title 48, section 16.403-1(c)(1)(i) through (iii) of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, states: 
Subsequent to the establishment of overall competition, the 
Contracting Officer shall find there is adequate price competition.  
Adequate price competition means, when used with respect to a 
contract action, there are sufficient price offers to establish price 
competition for a best value contract award.  Adequate price 
competition shall be established when three or more responsible, 
independent offerors submit timely and responsive offers.  If adequate 
price competition cannot be established because there are less than 
three responsible, independent offerors who submit timely and 
responsive offers, the Contracting Officer shall conduct market 
research to establish commercial reasonableness of the price offer.  
The market research shall be consistent with the service or good being 
procured, based on pricing within the last two calendar years, and 
based on quantities consistent with the current procurement.  A 
Determination and Finding, signed by the Contracting Officer and the 
Head of the Contracting Activity, shall be completed wherein it 
clearly denotes the facts surrounding the procurement and the facts 
ascertained from the market research. 
C. Fair and Reasonable Prices 
1. Clarify the Definition of Certified Cost or Pricing Data 
The definition of certified cost or pricing data, which is cited in title 48, 
section 2.101, of the Code of Federal Regulations should be modified.  A 
modified version of the language is: 
Certified cost or pricing data is defined as any prime or subcontract 
offeror data, presented to the government or government prime 
contractor, for the purpose of establishing the reasonableness of 
offeror pricing.  Certification is achieved by submission of written 
 
52.  See generally id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii). 
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confirmation by an authorized offeror representative stating: 
“This certification states that, to the best of the person’s 
knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data are accurate, 
complete, and current as of a date certain before contract award.” 
Examples of certified cost or pricing data include, but are not limited 
to, supplier quotes, commercial catalogs, price lists, supplier 
agreements, distribution agreements, labor records, general and 
administrative accounting records, or other government contracts for 
the same or similar goods or services.  Certified cost or pricing data 
shall be considered valid if the information provided has been active 
and valid within the preceding three years. 
 
Unlike the current definition, this language actually explains the 
purpose of the data, gives concrete examples of the type of data that 
can be utilized without making it unnecessarily restrictive, and places 
reasonable limits on the data submitted. 
2. Clarify the Utilization of Certified Cost or Pricing Data or Other than Cost 
or Pricing Data in Establishment of Fair and Reasonable Prices 
The second policy recommendation is to modify the current language as it 
relates to certified cost or pricing data in establishing fair and reasonable prices.  
Proposed alternate language, which would modify title 48, section 15.402, of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, would read: 
Certified cost or pricing data shall be required for all prime or 
subcontract offerors and all procurements above the simplified 
acquisition threshold.  The Contracting Officer may utilize data from 
internal government sources, the commercial market, or other forms of 
market research.  Said external research must be for the same or 
similar goods or services and have been active within the last three 
years.  The Contracting Officer shall request only sufficient 
information to establish the fair and reasonable nature of offers and no 
more.  Information submitted under these provisions shall be used 
strictly to establish whether an offer(s) are fair and reasonable in price. 
This recommendation is significant because it gives specific guidance and 
examples of information that a Contracting Officer can consider in establishing 
fair and reasonable prices.  The current language is so vague that the proposed 
level of specificity should assist in making better pricing decisions.  Further, it 
should help prospective offerors understand the types of information that they 
will need to produce in conjunction with their offer.  Overall, it should make the 
process easier for all parties and yield faster, more efficient results. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The United States government has been subjected to bad government 
contract awards and embarrassing newspaper headlines because of inadequate 
competition and pricing procurement regulations.  There is a general lack of 
clarity; language that conflicts with its stated purpose creates unnecessary 
loopholes, gives contractors impressions and contentions of control over 
government procurements, and provides a general lack of direction and 
guidance.  The government could improve these regulations by re-writing them, 
removing any references to beliefs and contentions, and writing better 
definitions.  The government is in a unique position, due to current austerity 
measures, to actually improve the government contract system.  The 
government can avoid the $500 hammers and $750 toilet seats, but it will be a 
bridge to nowhere if the regulations are not revised. 
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